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1 Introduction
Dissipation of economic rent under poorly defined property rights has plagued global fisheries
resources for decades (Gordon, 1954; Scott, 1955; Hardin, 1968; Ostrom, 2008). Regulators have
attempted to address the problem by controlling the quantity of factor inputs or fishing effort
allocated to the resource, e.g., controls on the number of vessels and their size, limits on fishing
time, controls on the type and quantity of gear deployed. Input control regulation, known alter-
natively as controlled access, may slow but generally dos not prevent overcapitalization and rent
dissipation and instead is associated with a costly race to fish, low product quality and price, un-
safe fishing conditions, and habitat degradation (Arnason, 1993; Casey et al., 1995; Homans and
Wilen, 1997, 2005). Rights-based (RB) management approaches, such as individual fishing quo-
tas (IFQs), refocus regulation to the control of the harvest. RB approaches provide incentives to
minimize the cost of harvesting annual quotas and promise to realign fleet harvesting capacity
with the sustainable catch (Montgomery, 1972; Segerson and Squires, 1990; Weninger, 1998).
Claims of the sizable economic benefits from adopting RB management are pervasive (Arna-
son, 1990; Wang, 1995; Weninger, 1998; Batstone and Sharp, 2003; Homans and Wilen, 2005;
Brinson and Thunberg, 2016) while studies that measure economic gains and validate claimed
efficiency benefits are rare. This paper fills this gap.
Evaluation of RB fisheries management reform faces several challenges. A first is limited
data; quantifying changes in revenues and costs as fishermen adjust to changing economic in-
centives under RB operating rules is data demanding. Our data include the universe of vessel
operations that participated in the US West Coast groundfish limited entry trawl fishery, here-
after the groundfish fishery, from 2009-16. The data period spans two years prior to and six
years following the implementation of IFQ regulations (data collection is overseen by the North-
west Fisheries Science Center). We observe annual vessel-level harvests across all groundfish
species, revenue, variable and fixed operating expenses, capital costs, multiple vessel character-
istics, crew labor, and other factors. Observing the universe of participating vessels across an
8-year span allows evaluation of multiple aspects of economic performance that was previously
not possible.1
Delayed rationalization highlights a second challenge in the evaluation of RB management
reform. A significant component of the rent gains take the form of costs saving from removing
redundant capital that built up under the period of controlled access regulation. The ground-
1We are aware of one study that measures changes in cost efficiency and fishery rent using pre- and post-IFQ
regulation data on harvesting costs. Grafton et al. (2000) study a sample of 107 vessels that participated in the B.C.
groundfish fishery during three separate years; 1988 (two years before an individual vessel quota regulation was
implemented), 1991 (the year the regulation was implemented) and 1994 (two-years following implementation). A
larger literature measure (only) changes in technical efficiency pre- and post-IFQ regulation using primal models
(e.g., Solís et al. (2014)).
2
fish fishery, from 1982-2010, experienced a build-up of its fishing fleet, stock depletion across
multiple groundfish species, and reductions in profitability.2 Entry restrictions and bi-monthly
landings limits capped fishing mortality but did not prevent an economic tragedy of the com-
mons. In 2003 the US Congress financed a $46-million permit buyback program that removed
91 vessels (representing 35 percent of total limited entry permits) from the groundfish and asso-
ciated fisheries. This policy likely improved the economic outlook for groundfish fishermen, but
only temporarily (Warlick et al., 2018; Lian et al., 2010). In January 2011, the Pacific Fisheries
Management Council replaced input control regulation with IFQs; shares of annual groundfish
quotas were allocated gratis to eligible fishermen; entry restrictions and bi-monthly landings
limits were dropped.
IFQ regulations provide incentives to align fleet harvesting capacity with annual catch lim-
its (?). As was the case in West Coast groundfish, a common motive for adopting RB regula-
tions is fleet rationalization, i.e., the process of removing excess vessel capital that accumulated
under controlled access regulations. The transition from the initially overcapitalized to the RB-
equilibrium fleet structure can however takes years, even decades, to complete.3 Our data reveal
a pattern of delayed fleet rationalization. In light of such delays it is imperative that structural
analysis be conducted to characterize and measure the state of the rationalization process so
that long-term cost savings from rationalization can be identified.
A third challenge is that ours is an event study; we seek to compare before and after economic
performance but in an environment in which the abundance, growth, and spatial migration of
groundfish stocks is not directly observed and potentially nonstationary. Failing to control for
this component of productivity change will confound efficiency measurement with important
implications for our results.4 We control for the effects of unobserved stock abundance on fleet
productivity with a latent spatial-temporal productivity component that is estimated within
a stochastic frontier model. We extend a time-varying model of efficiency first developed by
Battese and Coelli (1988) and Kumbhakar (1990) to allow for spatial variation in unobserved
productivity effects in particular the latent groundfish stock abundance. Our approach isolates
2Section 2 provides additional details of historical developments in the groundfish fishery. See Warlick et al. (2018)
for a complete account.
3? document this remarkably consistent pattern wherein, following the introduction of RB regulations, oversized
fleets in Alaska, British Columbia, Chile, Norway, Denmark, Australia, Iceland, the Faroe Islands, and US fisheries
decline in size over periods of 10-20 years (see also Grafton et al. (2000), Turner and Weninger (2005) and Munro
et al. (2009)).
4The problem we face is that stock assessments methods only estimate the size and species composition of the
groundfish stock. Methods often rely on industry productivity to proxy for changes in unobserved abundance, which
likely introduces a circular interdependency with changes in productivity affecting abundance estimates and abun-
dance estimates affecting productivity measures. Stock assessments derived exclusively from fishery-independent
data are sometime available, but rarely at the spatial-temporal scale at which fishing operations are carried out. We
avoid this stock-abundance versus fishing productivity identification dilemma with a structural empirical estimation
that treats the groundfish stock as a latent variable.
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changes in economic performance that are attributable to IFQ regulatory reform. We measure
changes in technical efficiency, capital investment/divestment incentives, and resource rent fol-
lowing the switch to IFQ regulations.5
Our results show that vessel entry restrictions and bi-monthly landings limits prevented
full rent dissipation in the groundfish fishery. However, at the time IFQs were adopted, fleet
size and harvest capacity far exceeded sustainable groundfish catch levels. During the six years
under IFQs, fleet size declined 28.3% from 120 vessels in 2011 to 86 vessels in 2016. At the same
time total landings increased by roughly 22% from 53.14 million pounds to 64.98 million pounds
per year. We estimate average annual rent during the controlled access regulatory period (2009-
10) at $19.95 million per year. Annual rent increased to $25.39 million per year in the first two
years of the IFQ regime, 2011-12, increased again to $26.74 million per year during 2013-14 and
to $31.26 million per year in 2015-16.6
Under the pre-IFQ regulations, most (73.1%) active vessels operated in a region of increas-
ing returns to size. Our analysis of returns to size and vessel capital shadow prices confirm that
vessel owners faced incentives to divest capital under the IFQ regulation. Measured economies
of size and capital shadow prices have both moved toward levels predicted under an IFQ-regime
equilibrium fleet structure. However, we find evidence that the capital adjustment process re-
mained incomplete six years after the switch to IFQs. The implication is that further cost sav-
ings and rent gains are pending as of 2016; the transition to the IFQ-regime fleet structure was
incomplete six years after the IFQ program began. As other management changes occur, e.g.,
modifications to annual catch limits as stocks rebuild and opening rockfish conservation areas,
additional adjustments are likely in the fishery.
Our results regarding operation-specific technical efficiency do not conform with earlier lit-
erature. Grafton et al. (2000) report that average technical efficiency increased three years
after IFQs were introduced in the B.C. halibut fishery.7 Schnier and Felthoven (2013) find that
technically inefficient vessels were more likely to exit the Bering Sea and Aleutian Island crab
5At the same time, a cooperative management program was implemented for the at-sea mothership trawl fleet. In
principle, a cooperative management program will internalize the costs associated with ill-defined property rights in
common pool fishery resources. This study examines harvesting efficiency and general economic performance among
vessels that participated in both the IFQ regulation and under the cooperative management program. We cannot
separately identify the effects of the simultaneous introduction of the cooperative and IFQ regulation.
6During 2011-13, quota owners could temporarily lease landings rights to other vessel operators but could not
permanently transfer quota through sale. The decision to prohibit permanent quota trades during the first two years
was intended to allow fishermen opportunity to learn how the fishery will function under catch shares management so
they may be better able to assess the value of individual fishing quotas before trading begins. Permanent transfers
through sales began in 2014. We are unable to determine if restrictions on permanent quota transfers impacted
capital restructuring.
7The Grafton et al. (2000) finding is based on a comparison of technical efficiency among 11 vessel operations
sampled from the pre-IFQ fishery and 21 (potentially) different vessels sampled in post-IFQ fishery. The power of
the test used to compare technical efficiency across regulatory regimes may be impacted by limited data.
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fishery when the IFQ regulation began. Brandt (2007) compares technical efficiency among sur-
viving, exiting, re-entering vessels in the Mid-Atlantic clam fishery and finds that vessels that
re-entered during a period preceding the introduction of IFQs were less efficient than vessels
that exited under the IFQ regulation, and that both vessel classes were less efficient than those
that remained under the IFQ regulation.
We do not find evidence that technical inefficiency played an important role in fleet downsiz-
ing. Our results indicate that economies of size on the other hand is strongly inversely correlated
with vessel exit under groundfish IFQs. Smaller vessels were also more likely to exit the fishery,
as were vessels that operated in relatively less productive geographical regions. We conclude
that multiple factors likely influence a decision to exit an overcapitalized fishery under IFQ
regulations. Further research on this topic is warranted.
2 Background
The West Coast groundfish fishery is managed by the Pacific Fisheries Management Council
(PFMC), a stakeholder body that formally advises the National Marine Fishery Service (NMFS)
on management of fisheries in federal waters located 3 to 200 miles off California, Oregon, and
Washington. Over 87 species of groundfish are found on the continental shelf and slope, with
multiple species that inhabit common geographical regions and depths. The commercial fishery
is comprised of four sectors: limited entry trawl, sablefish endorsed limited entry fixed gear, non-
endorsed limited entry fixed gear, and open access. Tribes located in the state of Washington also
participate in the West Coast groundfish fishery. The limited entry trawl component received all
whiting allocation and over half of the other groundfish species allocated to the four commercial
sectors. See Warlick et al. (2018) for a detailed history of the fishery. This paper focuses on the
shoreside trawl and the at-sea whiting sectors of the fishery.
The modern history of management began in 1976 with the passage of the Magnuson-
Stevens Act. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, factory trawlers from foreign nations such as
Japan, Russia, and Korea operated in this fishery. The Magnuson-Stevens Act established a 200-
mile Exclusive Economic Zone off the shore of the United States, thereby defining the groundfish
fishery as a domestic resource. Policies such as the Capital Construction Fund promoted acqui-
sition of vessels and gear by domestic fishermen. By the early 1980s, the West Coast groundfish
fleet size and accompanying harvest had reached unsustainable levels; West Coast groundfish
landings peaked at 139.95 thousand metric tons (mt) in 1982.8 In 1994, the NMFS implemented
8In 1982 the 139.95 thousand mt of groundfish landed included 61,594.8 mt of rockfish and only 7,973.5 mt of
whiting. In 2012 groundfish landings on the West Coast were 92,188.4 mt, or 66% of the 1982 peak level. The species
composition was however very different. Whiting accounted for 67,635 mt in 2012, or over 70% of landings at an
average price of $0.14 per pound. Due to overfishing of some groundfish species, rockfish landings were only 4,787
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a limited entry program for the groundfish fishery. The threshold catch history required to ob-
tain a limited entry permit was fairly low, and therefore the program did not sufficiently reduce
harvesting capacity.
Seven species of groundfish were declared overfished in 1999 and management steps were
taken to rebuild these species’ stocks.9 The use of time- and space-based prohibitions on fishing
became common. In 2002, the PFMC took the unprecedented step of prohibiting fishing at large
portions of the continental shelf where most of the overfished species live.
In 2000 the Scientific and Statistical Committee of the PFMC declared overcapitalization
the number one problem in the West Coast groundfish fishery. The permit buyback program
was implemented in 2003 for the limited entry groundfish trawl fleet. Ninety-one limited entry
trawl permits were purchased reducing the total number of permits to 180. The trawl buyback
program significantly reduced the number of active vessels in the commercial trawl fishery,
and as a result, catch and revenue per vessel from groundfish increased in 2004 (Warlick et al.
(2018)).
In September 2003 the PFMC voted to consider implementing an IFQ management program
in the West Coast groundfish trawl fishery. In November 2008, the PFMC voted to implement
the management plan. The main goals of the new regulation are to maintain landings levels
for species with healthy stocks, minimize bycatch of species with depleted stocks, and further
reduce harvesting capacity in the fishery.
Pre IFQ regulations in the groundfish fishery included a combination of two month landings
limits (called trip limits), gear restrictions, area closures, and observer coverage on about 20%
of trips targeting groundfish. A permit owner that did not fish his/her allocation of a species
during a two month period lost that allocation. Vessels that fished with a trawl endorsed limited
entry permit were required to use trawl gear (with the exception of a pilot program in Morro
Bay, CA which allowed sablefish to be caught with fixed gear).10 The constraints on harvesting
operations under the bi-monthly landings limits is further investigated in Section 5.2.2.
Management under the IFQ system is based on monitoring catch (as opposed to landings).
Observer coverage is required on 100% of trips targeting groundfish. Groundfish fisherman
must possess or acquire quota for each pound of fish caught. Individual fishermen were allocated
quota based on landings during a historical period. During 2011 and 2012, fishermen could
transfer quota to other fisherman by selling pounds associated with their initial quota allocation.
Permanent sales of quota shares, i.e., permanently transferring the quota pounds of a species
mt in 2012.
9A species is deemed overfished if its biomass falls below 25% of its estimated unfished biomass. The seven
overfished species were yelloweye rockfish, canary rockfish, widow rockfish, darkblotched rockfish, boccacio, cowcod,
and Pacific Ocean perch.
10During 2009 and 2010 a limited number of vessels participating in a pilot program. Fixed gear-caught sablefish
is considered a higher quality product than trawl-caught sablefish and typically sells for a higher price.
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allocated each year, began in 2013. Fishermen have more flexibility in choosing the gear type
used for harvesting groundfish. For example, hook and line gear or pots can be used for sablefish
harvested with trawl quota.
3 Data
Our data combines annual operating expenses, collected under the Economic Data Collection
(EDC) program, and landings and revenue data, collected from the Pacific Fisheries Informa-
tion Network (PacFIN) database. The data are available for all vessels participating in the
groundfish fishery; 158 unique vessel operations in all. Additional information on marine fuel
prices was obtained from the Pacific States Marine Fisheries Commission.11
The EDC data contain all expenses incurred while fishing on the US West Coast during the
data period.12 Vessel owners report fuel, ice and bait expenses, payments to hired captains
and crew, food expenditures, and expenses for offloading the catch, among others. The PacFIN
database records, at the trip level, vessel- and species-specific landings and revenues for all
West Coast landings. Additional revenues from at-sea landings are obtained from the EDC cost
survey.13 Information on days at sea, gear usage, crew size, fuel consumption, and the crew
share system is available in the EDC data.
We separate expenses into variable and fixed components. Variable costs include expendi-
tures on crew and captain labor, gear, fuel, bait, food, ice, communications, vessel maintenance
and offloading of the trip catch. Fixed annual costs include expenses for moorage, insurance,
and vessel association dues.14
It is typical, as in our data, to observe wide variation in capital utilization during a given
calendar period. For example, the 5’th and 95’th percentile values of reported days at sea in our
data are 22 and 160, respectively. Twenty-nine of the 158 unique vessels in the data (38.3%)
participated in Alaskan fisheries during 2009-16.
These considerations have implications for measuring economic performance in commercial
fisheries. A common view is that vessel capital is a quasi-fixed factor of production (Kirkley and
11Available at http://www.psmfc.org/efin/data/fuel.html.
12Vessels that participate in the West Coast shoreside groundfish fishery may also participate in (i) other West
Coast shoreside fisheries such as crab and shrimp, (ii) the West Coast at-sea groundfish fishery (where participating
vessels almost exclusively deliver whiting to at-sea motherships), and (iii) Alaskan fisheries. Few vessels participate
in all of three fisheries, and few participate in the West Coast groundfish fishery only. Participation in Alaskan
fisheries is considered when calculating fixed annual operating costs.
13At-sea deliveries are made to at-sea processors in the Pacific whiting fishery. At-sea revenues are comprised
almost entirely of whiting.
14Vessel associations provide service in the form of information provision, networking services, and lobbying of
management authorities.
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Strand, 1988; Segerson and Squires, 1990).15 We measure the flow of capital services that are
utilized by individual harvesting operations in our data. We denote this capital measure as ki
for operation i and emphasize that its units are 2016 dollars. Appendix A.4 explains how capital
services are measured.16
Our data include 844 vessel-year observations on 158 unique vessels across eight years.17
Each vessel is observed for an average of 5.34 years.18 Vessels range from 27 feet to 149 feet
in length. The average vessel spends 91.66 days at sea per year, lands 3.38 million pounds of
groundfish, crab and shrimp and earns an annual revenue of $854,170. Descriptive statics for
the annual landings, expenses, revenue, and days at sea are reported in Table 6 in Appendix
A.1.
As in most commercial fisheries, crew remuneration takes place under a share system where
individual crew members are paid pre-determined shares of revenues, in most cases with com-
ponents of variable costs deducted. The price of labor, as seen by the vessel manager is a share of
harvest revenues. Prices of miscellaneous expenses are not available in our data. We therefore
include only the price of fuel in our cost specification.
3.1 Multiple-species harvest technology
Treating each of the 87 West Coast groundfish as a unique output in a multi-output harvest
technology is not practical. To reduce the dimensionality of our estimation, we aggregate, lin-
early, across several species to form species groups based primarily on species importance in
landing and revenue and management focus. Our initial output groupings include: (1) Pacific
whiting landed at shore, (2) Pacific whiting delivered to at-sea motherships, (3) dover sole, (4)
thornyhead sp., (5) sablefish caught with trawl gear, (6) sablefish caught with pot and long-
line gear, (7) non-DTS species (DTS indicates dove sole, thornyheads, and sablefish), (8) crab,
(9) shrimp and (10) other non-groundfish species.19 Major non-DTS species include yellowtail
15Empirical models of fishery production often measure the capital input using a stock measure such as vessel
length. This approach implies that capital services provided by all 50 foot length vessels is identical, regardless of
whether they spend 22 or 160 days at sea.
16This calculation of capital costs assumes fishing vessels are perfectly malleable, i.e., they can be reallocated to
other fisheries or used in non-fishery activities without incurring additional adjustment costs. If adjustment costs
are present our approach will overstate vessel capital value (Singh et al. (2006)). Our data suggest the capital
malleability assumption is reasonable: groundfish trawl vessels regularly participate in crab and shrimp fisheries;
574 vessel-year observation (68.0 % of our data) harvest crab and/or shrimp in a given year and 91 (10.8%) report
landings of both trawl-caught and pot-caught fish in a single year, suggesting that switching across gear types is not
prohibitively costly.
17One vessel-year combination had missing data on fuel expenses and quantity and was dropped from our analysis.
1818 vessels are observed for one year; 24 for two years; 8 for three years, 5 for four years, 13 for five years, 15 for
six years, 21 for seven years, and 54 for all eight years.
19The non-DTS group includes all groundfish species, excluding whiting, dover sole, thornyheads and sablefish.
Other non-groundfish species include pelagic and highly migratory species and salmon. Species groups 1-7 are
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rockfish, widow rockfish, longnose skate, and Pacific cod. These species tend to be caught in
shallower waters relative to dover sole, thornyheads and sablefish warranting a separate out-
put category. The major species that comprise the other non-groundfish species category include
shad (327,339 pounds in 2012) and squid (54,200 pounds in 2012). Pot- and longline-caught
sablefish represent a small share of total landings and revenues (see Table 7 of Appendix A.1).
Models of multi-species harvesting technologies have followed three forms: (1) non-joint in
inputs where individual species are assumed to be harvested independently of one another;
(2) fixed output proportions, where the vector of harvested species is assumed fixed by relative
abundance of individual species stocks, and; (3) a flexible technologies wherein fishermen control
the mix of species harvested (see Turner and Weninger (2005); Branch and Hilborn (2008); Singh
and Weninger (2009, 2017)). Groundfish fishermen choose where, when, and at what depths
to deploy gear. Occasionally they configure trawl gear to harvest shrimp and use fixed gear to
harvest crab. These decisions impact the quantity and mix of harvested species and we therefore
specify a flexible multiple-output groundfish technology for our estimation.
Testing and measurement of output substitution possibilities is complicated by the unob-
servability of the groundfish stock abundance at appropriate temporal and geographical scale.20
In particular, variation in the observed output levels and species mix may be due to deliber-
ate targeting actions of fishermen or natural variation in the unobserved (from the researchers
perspective) stock abundance.
A preliminary analysis of trip-level landings by species suggests the technology exhibits
harvest jointness for whiting, trawl-caught sablefish, dover sole, thornyheads, and non-DTS,
and other groundfish species, and non-jointness in crab, shrimp and pot-caught sablefish species
(see Appendix A.5). These assumptions are maintained through the remainder of our analysis.
Finally, a common approach in applied production analysis to impose known properties of
cost functions during estimation, e.g., linear homogeneity in input prices, convexity in harvest.
The regulatory history of the groundfish fishery and evidence presented below indicate, how-
ever, that operating conditions in the groundfish fishery do not match those expected in com-
petitive and unregulated industries. Imposing curvature properties in our regulated fishery
environment may be inappropriate. We therefore avoid such restrictions and interpret our cost
functional form as a second order approximation to the true cost technology over the domain
of harvests, input prices, and capital allocations that are observed in our data. Results are
interpreted accordingly.
included under the West Coast Groundfish Trawl Catch Share Program.
20Vessels in our data operate over a latitude range of roughly 13.48 degrees from California to the US-Canadian
border.
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3.2 Groundfish stock effects
The minimum cost of landing groundfish is assumed to vary with harvest quantity, prices of
factor inputs (fuel, labor, gear, and vessel capital services), and the abundance of the in situ
fish stock. Commercial groundfish fishing involves dragging a large trawl net across the sea
bottom, or at intermediated depths if pelagic species are targeted. The quantity and mix of
species captured depend crucially on stock abundance under the boat at the depths the trawl
net is dragged (see Branch and Hilborn (2008)). At the annual level, the catch performance of
a vessel operation will depend on the ability of the vessel skipper to consistently position the
vessel on high concentrations of the species’ stocks being targeted.
Factor input substitutions and output transformation relationships will, in general, depend
on stock abundance and species mix. Changes in the stock, if uncontrolled, will bias the es-
timation of a multiple species harvest technology. To see this, consider a two-species fishery
and suppose the abundance of one of the species declines over a data period. Estimated output-
transformation relationships will represent the data-period average but will not capture the
output-transformation relationship at a particular stock mix. Moreover, it will be impossible to
determine if changes in the observed harvest mix are due to a changing stock mix or targeting
behavior of fishermen. Note finally that unobserved and potentially spatially and temporally
heterogeneous stock abundance creates an identification problem in the analysis of harvest effi-
ciency since low costs may be the result of superior management skill or unobserved differences
in stock abundance.
We treat unobserved stock abundance, more precisely, its effect on harvest costs, as a latent
variable. We estimate the stock effect semi-parametrically. It should be noted that this approach
captures all time- and spatial-varying effects on costs, i.e., stock effects are not separately iden-
tified from other time- and spatial varying factors that might impact observed costs. We are
however able to obtain a time- and spatial-invariant estimate of the best practice costs frontier
as well as individual vessel efficiency measures.
4 Model
Let C(h,w,k,X ) to denote variable cost for a representative vessel operation: h is an M × 1
vector of species-specific harvests, w is a vector of factor input prices, k denotes quasi-fixed
capital, and X is a stock abundance vector that is conformable with h. The production period
is a single regulatory cycle, which in our case, is a year. For simplicity, we assume X is fixed
during the production period.
The fishery is regulated with species-specific quotas which require that harvest is matched
with quotas at the individual species level. We assume a frictionless quota trading market exists
10
and use r to denote the vector of annual quota lease prices.
Annual profit for a representative vessel operation is given as,
max
h,k
(p− r)h−C(h,w,k,X )−wkk,
where wk is the unit capital rental price. The necessary conditions for an interior solution to
the above problem plus an equilibrium entry-exit conditions can be used to characterize the
long-run equilibrium conditions in an IFQ-regulated fishery:
p− r = OhC(h,w,k,X ), (1a)
wk =− OkC(h,w,k,X ), (1b)
0= (p− r)h−C(h,w,k,X )−wkk, (1c)
where Oz denotes partial differentiation with respect to the argument z.
Condition (1a) determines the optimal per-vessel harvest vector. Condition (1b) identifies the
optimal capital size (evaluated at the optimal h), and condition (1c) is an equilibrium entry-exit
condition that determines the number of participating vessels. It should be emphasized that
conditions (1a)-(1c) characterize the IFQ-regime equilibrium; we do not expect these conditions
to hold precisely at a particular point in time. Rather, the conditions are used to help interpret
the state of groundfish fleet in our empirical data, and to gain insight on the changes we observe.
In particular, the quota lease price r is absent under an input-control regulation. It is hypoth-
esized that emergence of stock prices under the IFQ regulations will initiate adjustments to
per-vessel harvest activity and fleet restructuring. We next use this model to summarize these
expected changes.
If capital is a normal factor of production, we have OkC(h,w,k,X )< 0. Condition (1b) states
that marginal reduction in operating costs from an additional unit of k must just offset the unit
capital cost. If wk <−OkC(h,w,k,X ), the fisherman has incentive to invest in additional capital.
When wk > −OkC(h,w,k,X ), capital divestment is called for (see Segerson and Squires (1990)
for details).
We can use equations (1a)-(1c) to assess size economies. Multiplying condition (1a) by h and
combining with (1c) obtains,
S(h,w,k,X )= C(h,w,k,X )+wkk
h′OhC(h,w,k,X )
= 1. (2)
S(h,w,k,X ) has been proposed as a measure of multiproduct economies of size (Baumol,
1976; Panzar and Willig, 1977). S(h,w,k,X ) > 1 indicates operation in a region of increasing
returns, i.e., a 1% increase in h will result in a less than 1% increase in annual cost. In an
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IFQ fleet structure equilibrium, size economies must be exhausted, i.e., S(h,w,k,X )= 1; if not,
additional quota trades and harvest adjustments can further reduce costs, thus contradicting
the required condition that all gains from quota-trading are exhausted.
Although not emphasized in the representative fisherman model above, a third avenue by
which fleet restructuring may proceed is through removal of inefficient capital. Quota holders
in an IFQ fishery face a common quota holding cost and therefore must match the efficiency of
active quota holders (see also Montgomery (1972)). Our empirical version of the above model
will be extended to introduce heterogeneity in efficiency across vessel operations. The model is
adopted from the stochastic frontier literature for panel data with adaptations to account for the
unique characteristics of commercial fisheries (Battese and Coelli, 1992).21
Assume annual groundfish harvest costs take the form:
C(h,w,k,X )= c(h,k,w)×exp(η(X ,ui)+²) . (3)
The term ui ≥ 0 is a measure of efficiency for vessel operation i and ² is a symmetric regression
error term.
The effect of stock abundance on costs operates through the term η(X ,ui). Stock abundance
X is however unobserved. To proceed, we assume that the effect of stock abundance on costs
varies smoothly across space and time and can be approximated by a differentiable function
η(X ,ui)= η(s, t) ·ui where s indexes space and t indexes time. It is worth noting that while the
primary role of η(·) in our model is to control for potentially changing abundance, its inclusion
will capture all uncontrolled factors influencing costs that vary smoothly with (s, t). Stock abun-
dance effects cannot be separated from these other factors. Our results will be interpreted with
this limitation in mind.
We specify the logarithm of η as,
η(X ,ui)= η(s, t|α) ·ui+ζ= exp
(
J∑
j=1
α jb j(s, t)
)
·ui+ζ, (4)
where b j(s, t) denote known basis functions of (s, t), α j is a vector of basis coefficients, and ζ is
an approximation error.
21Battese and Coelli (1992) allow firm-level efficiency to vary over time (either positively, negatively or not at all) to
reflect common time-varying influences on firm-level productivity, for example, industry wide technological change.
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4.1 Cost functional form
We specify a deterministic kernel of our cost model as the following log-quadratic function:
ln c(h,k,w|β)=β0+
M∑
m=1
βmhm+ 12
M∑
m=1
M∑
n=1
βmnhmhn+βw ln(w)+ 12βww ln(w)
2
+
M∑
m=1
βwm ln(w)hm+
M∑
m=1
βkm ln(k)hm+βk ln(k)+
1
2
βkk ln(k)2,
(5)
where β collects all model parameters.
The functional form in (5) has several advantages. First, it is sufficiently flexible to capture
all economic effects needed to characterize the multiple-species groundfish fishing technology
(Diewert and Wales (1988); Fuss et al. (1978)). Second, and importantly for our application to a
multiple-species fishery, it is defined analytically when one or more species’ harvests are zero.
This situation occurs at each vessel-year observation in our data. Finally, the functional form is
linear-in-parameters which help simplify the estimation of β. Hereafter, the right-hand side of
((5)) will be expressed compactly as Zβ, where Z collects the cost function arguments.
4.2 Maximum likelihood estimation
Let vist = ²ist + ζist for vessel operation i = 1, . . . , I, fishing location s, and year t. We assume
vist is an independently and identically distributed normal random variable with mean zero
and variance σ2v. We assume vessel-specific cost efficiency in our data follows a half normal
distribution; ui ∼N+(0,σ2). We assume further that vist ⊥ ui, and (vist,ui) ⊥ Zist.
Combining all model components and taking natural logarithms obtains the following esti-
mating equation,
lnCist = Zistβ+η(s, t|α) ·ui+vist, for i = 1, . . . , I, s= s(i, t), t= 1, . . . ,Ti, (6)
where s(i, t) denotes the region fished by operation i in year t, Ti denotes the years of operation
for vessel i and I is the number of unique vessel operations in our data.
Battese and Coelli (1992) derive the density of e i =
{
ηstui+vist
}
t∈Ti ,
f (e i)=
[
1−Φ
(−µ∗i
σ∗i
)]
exp
(
−12
[
e′i e i
σ2v
−
(
µ∗i
σ∗i
)2])
(2pi)Ti /2 σ(Ti−1)v
[
σ2v+η′iηiσ2
] 1
2
, (7)
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where,
µ∗i =
η′ie iσ
2
σ2v+η′iηiσ2
σ∗i =
σ2σ2v
σ2v+η′iηiσ2
.
The log likelihood function for the I unique vessels observed in our data is:
ln L(θ|{lnCi}Ii=1)=
∑
i
ln
[
1−Φ
(−µ∗i
σ∗i
)]
− 1
2
∑
i
[
e′ie i
σ2v
−
(
µ∗i
σ∗i
)2]
− 1
2
∑
i
[
Ti ln(2pi)+ (Ti−1)ln(σ2v)+ ln
(
σ2v+η′iηiσ2
)]
.
(8)
where θ = (σv,σ,α,β) and lnCi = {lnCist}t∈Ti .
The minimum squared error predictor of cost efficiency for operation i is obtained as (Battese
and Coelli (1988)),
E[exp(ui)]=
[
Φ
(
σ∗i −
µ∗i
σ∗i
)/
Φ
(
−µ
∗
i
σ∗i
)]
×exp
(
µ∗i +
1
2
σ∗2i
)
. (9)
Maximum likelihood estimation of equation (8) is conducted with Gauss 18 software. We
estimate the full model in equation (5) under the maintained hypotheses regarding jointness
and separability across individual species (section 3.1).
5 Results
We conduct preliminary tests to inform the structural properties of the multiple-species ground-
fish technology. A likelihood ratio test is used to evaluate alternative specifications. Table 1
reports the results (see Appendix A.2 for details).
Likelihood ratio tests of cost function structure suggest a more parsimonious form than is
shown in equation (5). We find that with the exception of whiting, fuel-harvest cross effects can
be dropped from the model. We are also able to drop second order fuel price and capital effects.
The null hypothesis that cross effects among groundfish species are equal to zero is rejected
at significance level < 0.001. This result is noteworthy in light of the fairly strong collinearity
among harvests of groundfish species (variance inflation factors are in the range between 2.07
for the non-DTS species group to 4.77 for trawl-caught sablefish).
Our preferred specification includes first-order effects for fuel price and capital input, first-
and second-order effects for all nine landed species (whiting, trawl-caught sablefish, dover sole,
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Parametric restriction: χ2-stat p-value
βww =βkk = 0 4.330 0.885
βmm = 0 ∀ m ∈M 159.706 <0.001
βmn = 0 ∀ m,n ∈M, m 6= n 50.348 <0.001
βwm = 0 ∀ m ∈M 34.022 <0.001
βwm = 0 ∀ m 6= Whit. 10.472 0.767
βkm = 0 ∀ m ∈M 316.696 <0.001
βm =βn m,n= all Whit. 16.234 0.907
βm =βDTS ∀ m = D. Sole, T. Heads, Sblf. 45.502 <0.001
Table 1: Structural properties of groundfish cost technology. DTS species include dover sole,
thornyheads, and sablefish. w and k, denote fuel price and capital expenditures; h denotes
harvest; and m and n denote species in the set of 10 species groups (M).
thornyheads, non-DTS species, other non-groundfish species, crab, shrimp, and pot-caught sable-
fish), cross-effects for all groundfish species, a fuel price-landings cross-effect for whiting, and
capital-landings cross-effects for all species. The parameter estimates, standard errors, and
p-values are reported in Table 10 of Appendix (A.2).
5.1 Cost efficiency
We specify monomial basis functions in equation (4). The index is normalized to unity at the
southernmost latitude (35.27 degrees N. latitude) in January 2011, which is the date that the
IFQ regulation began. A value of unity is plotted along the perimeter to aid in interpreting
the results. Polynomials of varying degree were considered. Our preferred specification sets
η(s, t|α) = exp(αss+αtt+αstst) for vessels that specialize in non-whiting species and η(s, t|α) =
exp(αtt) for vessels that focus on harvesting pacific whiting.22
Figure 1 plots the estimate of η(s, t) over the latitudinal and temporal range of our data for
the non-whiting portion of the groundfish fleet. The estimate of common cost efficiency, hereafter
CCE, is lowest in the northernmost region in January 2009. The CCE increases moving from
the northern to southern region of the fishery, and during the 2009-16 data period. The increase
over time is most pronounced in the southern latitudes.
The true cause(s) of spatial and temporal variation in the CCE cannot be determined from
our data. A temporally increasing CCE could signal declining groundfish stock abundance, in
which case adjustments to annual quotas may be warranted. An alternative hypothesis is that
the requirement that at-sea discards count against quota holdings under the IFQ regulation pro-
vided incentives to undertake costly avoidance of fish species for which quota is scarce (Somers
22Data indicate that 599 of the 844 vessel-year observations (70.97%) report whiting harvest shares below 0.25;
222 vessels (26.30%) report whiting harvests shares above 0.75. Only 23 vessel-year observations (2.73%) report
whiting harvest shares between 0.25 - 0.75.
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Figure 1: Common Productivity. Figure reports point estimates for common cost efficiency com-
ponent, η(s, t). The index is normalized to unity at latitude 35.27 degrees N. in January, 2011.
et al., 2018).23 Investigation of these and other explanations is an important topic for future
research.
A final observation on our estimate of CCE is that a test of the null hypothesis that its ef-
fects are zero, i.e., that η(s, t) = 1 is rejected at conventional levels of significance (p-values for
estimates of αs and αt are less than 0.003 (the space-time cross effect is not statistically sig-
nificant). This finding has implications for measuring the effects of rights-based management
reform in fisheries. Suppose it could be confirmed that the temporal trend in the estimate of the
CCE is due to declining groundfish stock abundance. In this case, an analysis that ignores CCE
effects, i.e., naively sets η(s, t) = 1 will likely underestimate the efficiency gains attributable to
management reform. On the other hand, if the observed trend in the CCE is due to increased
costs arising from bycatch avoidance under the IFQ regulation, its effect on fleetwide costs are
attributable to management reform and should be included in an assessment of fishery perfor-
mance. In either case, our results suggest that taking steps to control for unobserved changes
in abundance and other factors is crucial for obtaining unbiased estimates of efficiency and eco-
23Singh and Weninger (2009) demonstrate cost savings from discarding fish at sea under a weak output dispos-
ability technology. The weak output disposability property cannot be tested in the absence of species-specific stock
abundance information.
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Figure 2: Vessel-specific Efficiency Estimates. Smoothed histograms calculated with an
Epanechnikov kernel at reference bandwidth.
nomic performance in fisheries.
The estimate of ui is interpreted as the ratio of realized costs to stochastic frontier costs con-
ditional on the common cost efficiency component. As is common in applied stochastic frontier
analysis, we find substantial cost inefficiency at the vessel level. Figure 2 plots the empirical
distribution of estimated ui for the 158 unique vessels in our data. The results show that the
bulk of the inefficiency estimates lie between 0.6 and 2.6. The implications of cost efficiency
heterogeneity for fleet adjustments are investigated in Section 5.2.4 below.
The next sections evaluate economic incentives of groundfish fishermen. These incentives
are measured from our fitted cost function and are generally functions of observed harvests, fac-
tor input prices, space and time, and the estimated parameters. We calculate effects of interest
for each vessel-year observation and report summary statistics.24 To ease notation we use n to
index individual observations in our data. It should be noted that n summarizes information on
the vessel operation i, the location of fishing, s and the observation year t.
24An alternative approach is to evaluate economic effects of interest at the mean of the data. This approach masks
important insights for fleet restructuring due to considerable differences in the quantity and mix of harvested species
among vessel operations.
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5.2 Economic effects of IFQ regime
5.2.1 Capital investment
Recall that capital is measured in units of annual capital expenditures (dollars). The necessary
condition for optimal capital employment (equation (1b)) must be modified to match our empiri-
cal data. Based on our empirical specification, the capital expenditure-cost elasticity is derived
as,
εnk =
∂lnC(·)
∂lnkn
=βk+
M∑
m=1
βkmhn,m.
where hn,m denotes landings of species m in observation n.
The capital allocation for observation n is optimal when −εnk is equal to the ratio of annual
capital costs and annual variable costs, wkknCn . In this case, the marginal reduction in variable
cost from the additional capital is just offset by the additional capital expenditure. Estimating
the latter is complicated given that there is wide variation in capital utilization in our data.
We proceed by selecting vessel operations that fished 75% or more of their estimated maximum
days at sea in year t (27 observations satisfy this criterion). The average value wkknCn for this
sub-sample is 0.16 (with standard deviation, 0.16). We use this average value as a benchmark
to characterize incentives to adjust vessel size, i.e., values of −εnk ≈ 0.16 indicate approximate
optimal capital size; values for −εnk > (<) 0.16 indicate incentives to invest (divest) vessel capital
given the observed harvest, input prices, location of fishing, and fishing date.
Panels (a)-(d) of Figure 3 plots point estimates of −εnk against, respectively, annual capital
expenditures (Panel (a)), vessel length (Panel (b)), the latitude of the landing port (Panel (c)),
and the cumulative month since January 2009 (Panel (d)). In Panel (a) we see that −εnk tends
to increase with annual capital employed (simple correlation is 0.19). Panel (b) shows a weak
correlation between vessel length and our estimate of −εnk. The simple correlation is -0.084
suggesting that incentives to adjust individual vessel size may be weak relative to the incentive
to adjust capital utilization (panel (a)).
Panels (c) and (d) of Figure 3 plot −εnk against space and time. The pattern in Panel (c)
shows positive correlation with northern latitudes (simple correlation is 0.334). The pattern in
Panel (d) shows that a significant number of groundfish vessels faced incentives to divest capital
at harvest quantities observed during the earlier data years (simple correlation is 0.19). Trends
indicate that as capital exited the fishery, and catch was consolidated onto fewer boats, the
incentive to divest capital eased. Additional investigations find that vessel capital is a normal
factor of production at larger harvest quantities observed in our data; the simple correlation
between −εnk and annual landings is 0.21.
Summarising, results suggest that a significant number of groundfish vessels faced incen-
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Figure 3: Capital-Cost Elasticity
tives to divest capital particularly at harvest quantities observed in the early data years. Trends
suggest that as the catch per vessel increased, the incentive to divest capital declined.
5.2.2 Economies of size
To gain a sense of the extent to which bi-monthly landings limits under the controlled access
regulation constrained harvesters ability to exploit economies of size, it is instructive to com-
pare pre- and post-IFQ annual landings. We consider the major groundfish species, dover sole,
longspine thornyheads, and sablefish in the northern region of the fishery. Bi-monthly sablefish
landings limits allowed a total of 133,000 pounds per vessel in 2010; in 2016, five vessels landed
over 275,000 pounds of sablefish. Annual dover sole landings were capped at 650,000 pounds
per vessel in 2010; five vessels landed over 1,300,000 pounds of dover sole in 2016. Annual land-
ings of longspine thornyheads were capped at 112,000 pounds per vessel in 2010; in 2016, five
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Period N S 10% 25% 50% 75% Boats
2009-10 243 3.03 0.99 1.25 1.80 2.77 130
2011-12 218 2.20 0.87 1.13 1.49 2.62 122
2013-14 202 1.81 0.86 1.06 1.35 2.13 110
2015-16 173 3.53 0.70 0.98 1.40 2.34 95
All Years 836 2.64 0.87 1.11 1.56 2.46 158
Table 2: Economies of size summary statistics. Eight extreme estimates (Sn > 50) are dropped.
N denotes the number of vessel-year observations; S denotes annual landings-weighted average
economies of size.
vessels landed over 318,000 pounds of longspine thornyheads.
Removing bi-monthly landings limits, in addition to improving economies os size, may have
allowed vessel operators to exploit economies of specialization in harvesting. A Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index of annual harvest shares for groundfish species indicates a sample mean (me-
dian) value of 0.56 (0.42) in 2009-10. In the first two years of IFQ regulations, the sample mean
(median) index value jumps to 0.65 (0.57).
Table 2 reports the landings-weighted averages and percentile values of the Sn estimates.
We report results for the full sample (with outliers removed) and for four two-year subperiods:
the pre-IFQ period, 2009-10 and the remaining IFQ regulatory regime grouped into two-year
intervals. Recall that during the first of these intervals, 2011-12, IFQ regulations did not permit
permanent transfers of quota shares. The final column in Table 2 reports the number of unique
vessels that operated in the fishery during each subperiod.
The landings-weighted average value of Sn for the full data period is 2.64 suggesting that a
significant component of our sample vessel operate under increasing returns to size; aggregate
catch could be consolidated onto fewer vessels which should further reduce groundfish harvest-
ing cost. From Table 2 we see that Sn has declined under the IFQ regulation, with the largest
decline occurring during 2011-12. With few exceptions, percentiles of the Sn distributions move
over time toward the size-efficient benchmark, Sn = 1. Notice that the trend toward Sn = 1 takes
place as participating vessels declined from 130 in 2009-10 to 95 in 2015-16 (Table 2).
Figure 4 plots smoothed histograms of Sn estimates for vessel-year observations falling into
the pre-IFQ management regime (2009-10), the first two years of IFQ management (2011-12),
and the subsequent four years (2013-16). The right-skewed distributions confirm that a signif-
icant portion of the groundfish fleet operated in a regions of increasing returns throughout the
data period. The figure also shows that size economies distributions consistently place more
mass on values near unity as the IFQ regime progressed and the groundfish fleet downsized.
That is, the trend toward efficient utilization of vessel capital with Sn = 1 is apparent. The
largest shift in the scale efficiency distributions appears to take place immediately following the
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Figure 4: Economies of Size. Smoothed histograms calculated with an Epanechnikov kernel at
reference bandwidth.
switch to the IFQ regulation.
The results in Figure 4 demonstrate expected changes in size economies under the IFQ
regulation. The right skewed distribution in 2013-16 implies that untapped economies of size
and additional cost savings may still emerge in the groundfish fishery.
5.2.3 Rent generation
The equilibrium condition in (1c) asserts that economic profit evaluated at the virtual price vec-
tor p− r will equal zero in equilibrium. Condition (1a) shows that equilibrium quota prices
equate quota lease prices to the marginal profit from an additional unit of harvest. The quota
regulation generates resource rent that can be calculated as
∑
m rmQm where Qm denotes the
species m quota. We do not observe quota trading prices directly; we use our groundfish cost
model to estimate sample average values of p−OhCh(h,w,k,X ) which we report in Table 11 in
Appendix A.3. Alternatively, fishery rent can be calculated directly as total revenue generated
less the total fleet harvesting cost. This latter approach does not rely on the equilibrium as-
sumption and also allows us to isolate rent associated with groundfish harvesting only. For this
calculation we use the fitted cost model to estimate variable harvest costs at observed groundfish
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Period: 2009-10 (N = 244). Annual
Mean Std. 10% 50% 90% Total
Harvest (mill. lbs.) 1.96 3.06 0.14 0.66 5.96 239.49
Revenue ($‘000) 416.91 313.95 103.62 383.39 688.29 50,863.14
Cost ($‘000) 252.65 189.74 70.95 209.77 463.73 30,823.02
Profit ($‘000) 163.50 163.22 6.68 147.90 324.02 19,947.41
AC G.F. (N=182) 0.30 0.73 0.20 0.35 0.84 -
AC Whit. (N=62) 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.12 -
Period: 2011-12 (N = 219). Annual
Mean Std. 10% 50% 90% Total
Harvest 2.74 4.68 0.07 0.50 10.21 299.82
Revenue 597.06 561.39 83.42 420.82 1,272.77 65,378.15
Cost 349.59 327.05 79.85 236.25 729.27 38,280.14
Profit 242.95 271.44 -14.08 156.31 672.11 25,388.14
AC G.F. (N=163) 0.48 1.88 0.32 0.52 2.06 -
AC Whit. (N=56) 0.08 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.11 -
Period: 2013-14 (N = 193). Annual
Mean Std. 10% 50% 90% Total
Harvest 3.49 6.01 0.06 0.43 13.37 336.92
Revenue 689.92 677.74 84.57 438.56 1,697.23 66,577.45
Cost 417.07 402.58 75.82 270.51 982.16 40,246.86
Profit 263.42 309.69 -25.81 153.99 676.48 26,736.75
AC G.F. (N=146) 0.49 0.74 0.35 0.58 1.92 -
AC Whit. (N-57) 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.10 -
Period: 2015-16 (N = 178). Annual
Mean Std. 10% 50% 90% Total
Harvest 4.57 8.09 0.13 0.83 14.95 406.56
Revenue 886.41 735.56 123.77 666.38 1,880.96 78,890.15
Cost 516.50 427.97 99.08 396.38 1,051.32 45,968.79
Profit 351.23 369.87 -1.63 234.63 818.51 31,259.29
AC G.F. (N=131) 0.47 0.57 0.32 0.50 1.44 -
AC Whit. (N=47) 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.08 -
Table 3: Per-Vessel Harvest, Revenue, Cost, Economic Profit. AC - average cost per pound. The
reported mean value (AC only) is weighted by vessel harvest share. All monetary values are
expressed in USD 2016.
species landings with crab and shrimp landings set to zero. We assume vessel capital costs and
fixed operating costs are proportional to the days at sea harvesting groundfish species relative
to total days at sea. Profit calculations subtract reported costs of observers, which we interpret
as a real resource cost of operating the IFQ management program.25
Table 3 reports summary statistics for per-vessel aggregate harvests (all species except crab
and shrimp), revenue, cost, and profit. We also report landings-weighted cost per harvested
25Average observer expenses in our data are $11,533 per-vessel, per-year.
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pound (AC) for vessels that focus on groundfish fishing (harvest mix made up of >75% groundfish
species) and vessels that specialize in harvesting pacific whiting (harvest mix made up of >75%
whiting). Results are reported across two-year subperiods.
Several noteworthy results/trends are indicated in the table. First, the elimination of land-
ings restrictions coincide with a significant increase in per-vessel harvest. Pre-IFQ vessels har-
vested an average of 1.96 million pounds per year. The per-vessel average increased to 2.74
million pounds per year in the first two years of IFQ regulation and continued to increase under
the IFQ regime to a high of 4.57 million pounds per year in 2015-16 (233% above pre-IFQ levels).
Average revenue and cost per vessel operation follow similar trends.
IFQ regulation also coincides with a significant increase in resource rent. Profit (resource
rent) per vessel averaged $163,500 annually during the pre-IFQ period. Rent generated per ves-
sel increased steadily during the IFQ regime to a peak of $351,230 in 2015-16. Furthermore, the
per-vessel profit distributions display a persistent right skew and, consistent with our findings
regarding size economies, vessels operating under increasing returns earn less rent: the simple
correlation between profit and Sn is −0.139.
Interestingly, the average cost per pound of harvested groundfish increases under IFQ man-
agement (roughly, an $0.18 per pound increase); the landings-weighted average cost per pound
for non-whiting species is lowest during 2009-10, at $0.30. This result appears on the surface to
contradict the expected effects of management reform. In particular, replacing the bi-monthly
landings constraint with IFQs should not increase in average costs. Moreover, as argued above,
increases in per-vessel harvest obtained economies of size not exploited under the pre-IFQ reg-
ulation. Though Somers et al. (2018) note a sharp decline in at-sea discards under the IFQ
regime, representing potentially costly at-sea adjustments by vessels to avoid groundfish species
for which quota is scarce (Singh and Weninger, 2009), the explanation for low average costs dur-
ing 2009-10 is not fully known and warrants future investigation.
Annual totals, reported in the final column of Table 3, show significant expansion of ground-
fish harvest, revenue, costs, and rent during the data period. Rent generation in the groundfish
fishery has been substantial. Total rent generated in 2009-10 averaged $19.97 million per year.
In the first two years of the IFQ program annual rent increased to $25.39 million. A small rent
increase to $26.74 million per year is indicated during 2013-14, and a sharp increase to $31.26
million per year is estimated for the 2015-16 period.
These rent estimates are not adjusted for the common cost efficiency component of our model.
Recall, our estimate of η(s, t) suggests harvesting costs increased from 2009-16. An important
question is whether and to what extent changes in η(s, t) are the result of management reform?
If rising costs are the result of costly avoidance of bycatch species that began with IFQs, it is
reasonable that we include η(s, t) effects in our estimate of rent gains. In this case, the rent
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estimates in Table 3 are valid.
If the increase in η(s, t) over time is due to declining stock abundance, the resource rent
estimates reported in Table 3 underestimate the gains attributable to management reform. Our
model can be used to calculate by how much. When we hold common cost efficiency fixed at
its January, 2010 level, our estimates IFQ annual rent increase. Annual rent during 2009-10
is smaller at $19.69 million per year. The average rent increase under IFQs is now higher at
8.32% per year; $25.59 million in 2011-12, $25.92 million in 2013-14 and $34.16 million during
2015-16.
5.2.4 Fleet rationalization
The number of active vessels in the groundfish fishery declined by roughly 30% under IFQ man-
agement, from 124 in 2009 to 86 in 2016. This pattern is consistent with evidence of divestment
incentives and operation under increasing returns presented above. Our data reveal however
that 28 new vessel-operations entered the groundfish fishery under IFQ regulation (2011-16).
To further investigate changes in fleet structure we define three vessel categories: new entrants,
exiting vessels, and incumbents. We place each of the 128 vessels in our data into one of these
classifications as follows. If operation i first appears in our data in year t, is present in year t+1
and t+2 but not in year t+3, we set its year of entry to t and its year of exit to t+2. Note that
we do not know the entry year for vessels present in our first data year (2009), nor can we know
the exiting year for vessels present in our final data year (2016). The results that follow take
this limitation into account.
Table 4 reports descriptive statistics for entrants, exiting vessels, and incumbents across
three subperiods: the two years of controlled access regulation, the first two years of IFQs (with-
out permanent quota trades) and the subsequent four-year period of IFQ regulation when per-
manent quota trades were permitted. The table reports numbers of vessels, subperiod averages
for annual revenue (per vessel), vessel value, size economies (Sn), the latitude at which the
vessel conducted its harvesting operations, and our two cost efficiency measures.
Consider the entrant behavior. We see that, on average, 4.86 vessels entered the groundfish
fishery per year. Fifteen new vessels entered the first year of the IFQ program. Comparison
with the incumbent vessel class finds that the 2011-12 entrants were similarly configured as
2011-12 incumbents. Efforts of the Nature Conservancy to promote sablefish harvest with fixed
gear may have contributed to the large 2011 entrant class (?).
The number of entrants per year drops sharply under the IFQ regulation, to an average of
1.75 per year during 2013-16. In contrast, the average number of vessels exiting under IFQs
during the same period is 9.67 per year. Note that 20 vessels exited the groundfish fishery in the
first year of the IFQ program; after that, an average of 8.80 vessels per year exited the fishery.
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Entering Vessels
Year N Rev. $ Vessel Sn N. Lat. η(s, t) ui
2010† 6.00 226.08 83.90 6.90 38.21 0.92 1.37
2011-12 10.50 636.48 50.72 6.49 40.95 0.90 1.66
2013-16 1.75 1,266.34 161.22 2.76 42.27 1.03 1.67
All years 4.86 540.95‡ 118.60 4.31 41.31 0.97 1.62
Exiting Vessels
Year N Rev. $ Vessel Sn N. Lat. η(s, t) ui
2009-10 14.00 281.32 56.42 5.83 42.40 0.77 1.65
2011-12 7.50 236.52 58.82 6.39 42.04 0.89 1.26
2013-15† 9.67 606.27 137.59 4.84 41.61 1.01 1.58
All years: 10.29 407.78 91.89 7.31 41.96 0.91 1.51
Incumbent Vessels
Year N Rev. $ Vessel Sn N. Lat. η(s, t) ui
2009-10 106.50 576.41 87.81 2.82 42.99 0.83 1.51
2011-12 93.50 868.00 100.66 2.33 42.88 0.87 1.55
2013-16 86.75 1,158.12 127.35 2.51 43.16 0.92 1.58
All years 93.38 923.38 110.79 2.54 43.04 0.90 1.54
Table 4: Entering, Exiting and Incumbent Vessels. Reported values are annual and two-year
sub-period averages: N denotes mean number of vessels; Rev. is annual revenue per vessel;
$ Vessel is the vessel capital value in $ 2016; Sn is economies of size; N. Lat. is the north
latitude of the vessels main port; η(s, t) denotes common cost efficiency and ui is the vessel-
specific efficiency measure. † There are no observations for entrants in year 2009 or exiting
vessels in 2016. ‡ A single outlier observation is dropped from this calculation.
The net effect is a steady decline in the number of incumbent vessels with the exception of 2012
and 2016 where the number of incumbents increased by 5 and 6 boats, respectively.
Next consider differences across vessel categories. Incumbent vessels consistently generated
the largest average revenue over the three categories at $923.38 thousand per year. On average,
the annual revenue of entering (exiting) boats is 58.6% (44.2%) of average incumbent revenue.
Average revenue of incumbents increased following the switch to IFQ management: by 50.6%
during 2011-12 and by another 33.4% during 2013-16. Over time, the revenue generation of
entering vessels more closely resembled that of incumbent vessels (39.2% of average annual
incumbent revenue in 2009-10, 73.3% in 2011-12, and 109.3% in 2013-16) while exiting ves-
sels generated 48.8% in 2009-10, and 27.2% in 2011-12, and 52.3% in 2013-2016 of incumbent
average revenue).
The average value of Sn for entrants, exiting vessels and incumbents, is 4.31, 7.31 and
2.54, respectively. While this difference persists for the boats exiting the fishery under the IFQ
program, average size economies for entrants was only 10% larger (2013-16): 2.76 for entrants
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Model 1 (N=601) Model 2 (N=601)
Variable Estimate Std. Err. t-stat. p-val. Estimate Std. Err. t-stat. p-val.
Con. −0.337 0.338 −0.997 0.319 −0.395 0.330 −1.196 0.232
Vssl. length −0.004 0.009 −0.405 0.686 −0.004 0.009 −0.422 0.673
Returns to size 0.016 0.004 4.092 < 0.001 0.015 0.004 3.941 < 0.001
Common eff. (s, t) 0.244 0.136 1.800 0.072 0.246 0.133 1.850 0.065
Vssl. eff. −0.020 0.041 −0.481 0.631 −0.031 0.040 −0.772 0.440
Vssl. eff.×I t=2010 – – – – 0.062 0.025 2.461 0.014
Lat., s 0.007 0.005 1.365 0.173 0.007 0.005 1.352 0.177
Date, t −0.119 0.008 −1.367 0.172 0.004 0.009 0.453 0.651
Wht. Boat −0.091 0.029 −3.129 0.002 −0.088 0.030 −2.962 0.003
Table 5: Exit-Event Linear Probability Model. The dependent variable is an exit event. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the vessel level; there 158 unique vessels.
and 2.51 for incumbents. We see further that exiting vessels are on average smaller than both
incumbent and entering vessels. Entering vessels in contrast are 7.05% larger on average than
incumbent vessel operations.
The average port latitude for entering vessels is 1.73 degrees southward of the average in-
cumbent port location. The average port location of exiting vessels lies 1.08 degrees southward
of the port location for incumbents. This is consistent with our results on common efficiency
which suggest the northern latitudes are relatively more productive than southern latitudes.
Lastly, Table 4 reports average efficiency scores, ui, across the three vessel classes. Av-
eraging over all data years finds that entering vessels are inefficiency relative to incumbents,
average values are 1.66 versus 1.55. Exiting vessels are more cost-efficient than incumbents
and entrants although the differences are small. The average cost-efficiency of exiting vessels
(ui) was 23.3% lower than incumbent and entering vessels during the first two years of the IFQ
program, with this gap shrinking in later years. Comparison of vessel-group average efficiency
scores is inconclusive.
5.3 Vessel exit
This section presents results from a linear probability model of the decision to exit the IFQ
fishery. We construct an indicator variable for vessel operation i in year t that is equal to 1 if
the vessel exited the groundfish fishery, and 0 otherwise. This indicator is regressed on vessel
characteristics, measured economies of size, our estimate of common productivity, and vessel-
specific efficiency measures. Note that we cannot identify exit events that occur after 2016.
Moreover, to focus the analysis on the IFQ-regime forces affecting vessel exit decisions, we drop
2009 data. The data used in this analysis include 601 vessel-year observations with 64 exit
events (an exit rate of 10.09%).
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Results from two regression models are reported in Table 5. Both models include spatial
and temporal measures to control for unobserved influences on exit patterns, and a dummy
variable for whiting specialists vessels which exited less frequently than vessels specializing in
groundfish.
Both models find that economies of size is positively and statistically significantly correlated
with exit events, suggesting that vessel operations that did not exploit available economies of
size were more likely to exit under IFQs. The results find that common cost efficiency is pos-
itively correlated with exit events, i.e., vessels operating in unproductive regions were more
likely to exit.
Interestingly, our models do not find evidence that vessel size alone or vessel-level cost in-
efficiency are strongly correlated with exit. Both models indicate that technical efficiency has
a negative effect on exit; in both cases the parameter is statically insignificant at conventional
levels. Model 2 allows the effect of vessel-specific cost inefficiency to be different during the first
year of the IFQ program. Model 2 finds that ui is positively and significantly correlated with
exit events, with p-value, 0.014.
Summarizing, the exit event model suggests vessels that did not exploit available economies
of size were more likely to exit the groundfish fishery under the IFQ regulation. The correlation
between vessel-specific technical efficiency and exit is positive in the first year of the IFQ pro-
gram but weakly negative thereafter. We therefore cannot conclude that technical efficiency is a
reliable predictor of exit patterns.
6 Conclusion
This paper evaluates changes in harvesting efficiency, capital investment/divestment incentives,
vessel exit patterns, and resource rent in a major US fishery that switched from input control
regulations to an individual fishing quotas. We evaluate these effects using data on the uni-
verse of vessels that operated in the groundfish fishery over an eight year period that spans
regulatory reform. We modify a time-varying stochastic cost frontier model (Battese and Coelli,
1988; Kumbhakar, 1990) to control for temporal and spatial effects of unobserved stock abun-
dance and/or other unknown factors that may confound efficiency during the data period. The
methodology isolates changes in efficiency that are attributable to the individual fishing quota
regulation.
Our results find that input-controls slowed the dissipation of resource rent in the West Coast
groundfish trawl fishery. During the first six years of IFQs, the number of active groundfish
vessels declined 5.77% per year and fishery rent increased by 6.02% per year. The cost per har-
vested pound of groundfish initially increased before it stabilized under IFQs. Evidence suggests
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that removal of redundant capital built up under the input control regime, economies of size as
quota was consolidated onto fewer vessels, and increases in total harvests of the groundfish fleet
were key sources of rent gains. Results find further that vessels that did not exploit available
economies in harvesting exited the fishery. Vessels fishing in relatively unproductive regions of
the fishery were also more likely to exit. Finally, while technically inefficient vessels were more
likely to exit in the first year of the quota regulation, evidence of technical inefficiency among
vessels that exited in subsequent years is not indicated.
Overall, we find that fleet rationalization and rent generation in the West Coast groundfish
trawl IFQ program followed theoretical predictions: fleet size declined to align harvesting ca-
pacity with the aggregate groundfish quotas. Resource rent substantially increased under IFQs
with estimates at $31.26 million per year (40.48% of revenue) per in the final years of our data,
2015-16. Importantly, evidence from our structural empirical model suggests that fleet restruc-
turing remains incomplete six years following implementation of the IFQ regulation. Thus the
full economic benefits of the IFQ program are yet realized (Weninger, 1998; Grafton et al., 2000;
Turner and Weninger, 2005; Munro et al., 2009).
With the exception of the first year of the IFQ regulation, vessels that exited the ground-
fish fishery exhibited technically efficiency that is comparable with those that remained active.
Multiple factors likely influence the decision to exit an IFQ fishery. Further research into the
determinants of capital divestment decisions, the timing of exit, and the implications for har-
vesting efficiency may yield new insights and perhaps policy guidance to facilitate the transition
to the IFQ-regime fleet structure.
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A Appendix
A.1 Data descriptive statistics
The analysis of landings, cost, and revenue data offer a coarse overview of economic performance
before and after the introduction of the catch shares management program. Table 6 reports de-
scriptive statistics for our data separated into four two-year subperiods (parts A-D), and for the
full sample. The results show that average costs, revenues and net revenues increased consid-
erably in the post-catch shares period. In 2009-10, sample average net revenue increased from
$112,851 to $182,476 (61.7%). The cause(s) of the net revenue increase are not fully known.
Average annual landings per vessel increased 8.9%, over 200,000 pounds per year. Days at sea,
on the other hand, fell by almost 9 (9.05%). One contribution to the net-revenue increase under
catch shares management is the increase in dockside prices; the average landings-weighted fish
price increased from $0.65 in 2009-10 to $1.20 per pound in 2011-12, an increase of (89.2%).
Price increases have been observed in other fisheries that switch from command and control
management to rights-based management approaches. An important reason is that shortened
fishing seasons under command and control regulations, which are often subject to periodic fish-
ery closures, can create market gluts and low dockside prices (Casey et al. (1995); Weninger and
Waters (2003)). Higher per-vessel net revenues under catch shares management may however
be the result of exogenous price changes. Further investigation of the underlying cause of the
price increase in the West Coast groundfish fishery is therefore warranted.
Table 7 reports sample average (i) landings shares, (ii) revenue shares, and (iii) dockside
prices. Part A of the table reports values for the pre-catch share period, 2009-10; parts B-D
reports values for the catch shares management period, 2011-16. Results show that Pacific
whiting, dover sole, non-DTS species, and shrimp make up the largest share of annual landings
by weight. This is true for both the pre- and the post-catch shares periods. Annual average
landings shares have remained relatively stable across the two management regimes. Pacific
whiting, trawl-caught sablefish, dover sole, and thornyhead landings shares have fallen slightly
while shares of other species, pot-caught sablefish, crab, and shrimp have risen. Evidence pre-
sented below shows that crab and shrimp tend to be harvested independently of other groundfish
species. The increase in their shares in total landings may reflect an increase in specialization
in the harvest of these species.
The share of pot-caught sablefish landings, while small relative to total landings, has in-
creased substantially during the first two years of the catch shares management program. The
regulatory change that allows different gear types under the catch shares program is likely re-
sponsible for this change in gear usage. The cost and net revenue analysis below supports the
shift to pot-caught sablefish fishing (Table 7).
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A. 2009-10
Whiting Sblf. Trwl. D. Sole T. Heads Non-DTS Other Sp. Crab Shrimp Sblf. Pot
Land. Shr. 0.28 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.19 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.01
Rev. Shr. 0.21 0.19 0.14 0.04 0.14 0.04 0.15 0.07 0.01
Price 0.06 2.06 0.35 0.52 0.46 1.11 2.05 0.49 2.61
B. 2011-12
Whiting Sblf. Trwl. D. Sole T. Heads Non-DTS Other Sp. Crab Shrimp Sblf. Pot
Land. Shr. 0.25 0.03 0.15 0.03 0.15 0.07 0.09 0.15 0.08
Rev. Shr. 0.22 0.10 0.10 0.03 0.12 0.07 0.16 0.11 0.09
Price 0.07 2.21 0.43 0.56 0.64 1.07 2.98 0.61 2.91
C. 2013-14
Whiting Sblf. Trwl. D. Sole T. Heads Non-DTS Other Sp. Crab Shrimp Sblf. Pot
Land. Shr. 0.28 0.03 0.12 0.04 0.16 0.05 0.10 0.18 0.04
Rev. Shr. 0.24 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.15 0.05 0.19 0.15 0.04
Price 0.07 1.61 0.45 0.56 0.64 1.03 3.19 0.53 2.81
D. 2015-16
Whiting Sblf. Trwl. D. Sole T. Heads Non-DTS Other Sp. Crab Shrimp Sblf. Pot
Land. Shr. 0.27 0.03 0.13 0.03 0.18 0.05 0.06 0.17 0.08
Rev. Shr. 0.22 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.18 0.06 0.12 0.16 0.08
Price 0.04 1.75 0.43 0.58 0.63 1.01 4.08 0.73 3.08
All Years
Whiting Sblf. Trwl. D. Sole T. Heads Non-DTS Other Sp. Crab Shrimp Sblf. Pot
Land. Shr. 0.27 0.04 0.16 0.04 0.17 0.05 0.08 0.14 0.05
Rev. Shr. 0.21 0.11 0.10 0.03 0.15 0.05 0.16 0.12 0.05
Price 0.06 1.93 0.41 0.55 0.59 1.06 3.01 0.58 2.90
Table 7: Landings, Revenue and Prices 2009-16. SblfTrwl is trawl-caught sablefish; Thnyhead is
short- and longspine thornyheads; non-DTS includes all groundfish species, excluding whiting,
dover sole, thornyheads and sablefish; Other Sp. includes non-groundfish species such as pelagic
and highly migratory species and salmon; SblfPot is pot-caught sablefish.
Sample average revenue shares for sablefish and crab are the largest due to the higher
prices paid at the dock for these species. Changes in revenue shares across the two data periods
follow the pattern seen with landings shares, although shrimp revenues shares are unchanged.
Results in Table 7 reveal that average dockside prices for all species groups increased in the first
two years of the catch shares management program.
A.2 Cost structure
Likelihood ratio tests are used to evaluate alternative specifications of our cost technology (equa-
tion (5)). We test for second-order effects in input prices, second-order and cross-species effects,
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Whit. a.s. Sblf. D. Sole T. Heads Non-DTS Other Sp. Crab Shrimp Sblf. Pot
Whit. s.s. 0.410 -0.153 -0.178 -0.178 0.090 0.218 -0.058 -0.171 -0.088
Whit. a.s. 1.000 -0.261 -0.258 -0.226 -0.164 0.041 -0.152 -0.172 -0.078
Sblf. - 1.000 0.813 0.798 0.495 0.053 0.085 0.173 -0.153
D. Sole - - 1.000 0.677 0.614 0.071 0.032 0.152 -0.154
T.Heads - - - 1.000 0.277 -0.047 0.072 0.120 -0.137
Non-DTS - - - - 1.000 0.319 -0.034 -0.060 -0.146
Other Sp. - - - - - 1.000 -0.087 -0.171 -0.031
Crab - - - - - - 1.000 0.051 0.312
Shrimp - - - - - - - 1.000 -0.081
Table 8: Annual Landings: Simple correlations.
Whit. s.s. Whit. a.s. Sblf. D. Sole T. Heads Non-DTS Other Sp. Crab Shrimp Sblf. Pot
1.356 1.333 4.690 3.910 3.076 2.112 1.202 1.159 1.134 1.184
Table 9: Variance Inflation Factors.
and input price-species cross-effects. Table 1 (Section 5) summarizes results from these tests.
First, the null hypothesis that second-order fuel price and capital effects are jointly zero
(H0 : βww = βkk = 0) cannot be rejected at conventional levels of significance (p-value = 0.381).
Based on this result, second-order price and capital effects were dropped from our specification.
Next, we test the restriction that the cost technology is log-linear in harvests, i.e., H0 :
βhmm = 0, for m = 1, . . . ,M; this restriction is rejected (p-value < 0.001). Similarly, we test
the restriction that individual groundfish species cross-effects can be dropped from the model,
H0 : βmn = 0, for allm,n ∈M,m 6= n. The chi-square statistic for this test is 34.918 with p-value
0.005. This finding is consistent with our assertion that the groundfish trawl technology is
joint-in-inputs across major groundfish trawl species.
The null hypothesis that fuel price and landings effects are zero, i.e., H0 : βwm = 0, for m =
1, . . . ,M is also rejected (p-value < 0.001). However, based on anecdotal evidence that whiting
fishing is relatively fuel-intensive, we consider a specification with fuel price-landings effects
set to zero for all species other than whiting (H0 : βwm = 0, for all m 6= whiting). We fail to
reject this restriction (p-value=0.124). We therefore set βwm = 0 for all non-whiting species or
species groups. Next, the hypothesis that capital-landings effects are zero (H0 :βkm = 0, for m=
1, . . . ,M) is rejected at conventional levels of significance (p-value < 0.001). Note, the parameter
estimates reflecting capital-landings cross effects βkm are negative, suggesting that cost-capital
elasticity is declining in landings quantity (see Table 10).26
Next, we test some potential aggregations of species. The null hypothesis that at-sea and
shore-based whiting landings have distinct effects on groundfish landings costs is tested against
26Asymptotic normal tests of individual parameter restrictions fail to reject the null hypotheses that βkm = 0 for
trawl-caught sablefish, dover sole, thornyheads, and shrimp.
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the alternative hypothesis that the two whiting types can be linearly aggregated. We fail to
reject the implied parameter restriction (p-value = 0.387). We therefore aggregate at-sea and
shoreside whiting landings linearly.
Finally, trip-level correlations in Table (12) suggest that dover sole, thornyheads, and sable-
fish (known as the DTS group among industry and managers) are grouped together perhaps due
to the frequency with which they are jointly harvested. We however test and reject a specifica-
tion in which DTS are linearly aggregated (p-value < 0.001)
Summarizing, our preferred specification for the multi-species cost technology (equation (5))
includes first-order effects for fuel price and capital input, first- and second-order effects for nine
landed species (whiting, trawl-caught sablefish, dover sole, thornyheads, non-DTS species, all
other groundfish species, crab, shrimp and pot-caught sablefish), cross-effects for all groundfish
species, a fuel price-landings cross-effect for whiting, and capital-landings cross-effects for all
species.
A.2.1 Cost model parameter estimates
Table 10 contains the parameter results from maximum likelihood estimation of the multi-
species stochastic cost frontier model.
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Preferred Model No Cross-Species Effects
Parm. Est. Std. Err. t-stat. p-val. Est. Std. Err. t-stat. p-val.
β0 6.661 0.191 34.820 <0.001 6.841 0.186 36.761 <0.001
β1 0.144 0.041 3.552 <0.001 0.161 0.040 3.976 <0.001
β2 12.994 6.692 1.942 0.052 15.760 6.524 2.416 0.016
β3 2.358 1.434 1.644 0.100 2.623 1.285 2.040 0.041
β4 6.287 6.472 0.971 0.331 8.095 6.458 1.253 0.210
β5 3.296 0.937 3.518 <0.001 2.756 0.744 3.704 < 0.001
β6 20.689 2.047 10.106 <0.001 15.082 1.696 8.892 < 0.001
β7 19.835 1.730 11.465 <0.001 18.706 1.770 10.571 < 0.001
β8 2.194 0.472 4.653 <0.001 2.115 0.487 4.421 <0.001
β9 18.995 1.925 9.870 <0.001 18.752 1.989 9.427 < 0.001
β11 -0.003 0.001 -4.740 <0.001 -0.001 <0.001 -2.444 0.015
β12 0.074 0.166 0.447 0.655 - - - -
β13 -0.008 0.031 -0.262 0.794 - - - -
β14 -0.594 0.316 -1.881 0.060 - - - -
β15 -0.002 0.013 -0.147 0.883 - - - -
β16 0.261 0.053 4.940 <0.001 - - - -
β22 -15.033 14.294 -1.052 0.293 -10.676 6.775 -1.576 0.115
β23 -1.978 2.124 -0.931 0.352 - - - -
β24 6.211 5.800 1.071 0.284 - - - -
β25 0.836 1.146 0.730 0.466 - - - -
β26 17.482 9.847 1.775 0.076 - - - -
β33 -0.181 0.425 -0.139 0.670 0.040 0.129 0.309 0.758
β34 2.273 1.524 0.405 0.134 - - - -
β35 -0.135 0.261 0.174 0.606 - - - -
β36 -0.545 1.589 -0.502 0.733 - - - -
β44 -8.820 5.354 -0.836 0.100 0.691 3.707 0.187 0.852
β45 -1.603 1.405 -0.392 0.254 - - - -
β46 -13.891 10.227 -0.018 0.174 - - - -
β55 -0.270 0.205 -1.244 0.188 -0.491 0.137 -3.577 <0.001
β56 -0.409 0.842 0.518 0.627 - - - -
β66 2.485 3.632 -0.494 0.494 -2.903 3.052 -0.951 0.342
β77 -3.649 2.283 -1.221 0.110 -3.886 2.340 -1.661 0.097
β88 -0.105 0.086 -0.918 0.219 -0.149 0.085 -1.754 0.079
β99 -12.872 1.444 -6.506 <0.001 -12.895 1.479 -8.716 <0.001
βw1 0.032 0.006 3.408 <0.001 0.028 0.006 4.348 <0.001
βk1 -0.008 0.003 -3.596 0.019 -0.010 0.003 -2.984 0.003
βk2 -0.959 0.684 -0.676 0.161 -1.194 0.666 -1.791 0.073
βk3 -0.181 0.146 -0.814 0.215 -0.233 0.128 -1.826 0.068
βk4 -0.461 0.666 -0.438 0.489 -0.695 0.666 -1.043 0.297
βk5 -0.222 0.093 -2.655 0.017 -0.177 0.073 -2.414 0.016
βk6 -1.917 0.221 -6.842 <0.001 -1.221 0.163 -7.513 <0.001
βk7 -1.661 0.171 -8.785 <0.001 -1.534 0.175 -8.780 <0.001
βk8 -0.143 0.048 -1.601 0.003 -0.132 0.049 -2.677 0.007
βk9 -1.376 0.188 -5.912 <0.001 -1.350 0.194 -6.949 <0.001
βw 0.454 0.046 6.631 <0.001 0.440 0.047 9.328 <0.001
βk 0.426 0.018 33.049 <0.001 0.413 0.018 23.544 <0.001
αs -0.489 0.190 -2.578 0.001 -0.464 0.198 -2.339 0.019
αt 0.484 0.163 2.960 0.003 0.576 0.189 3.049 0.002
αst 0.118 0.312 0.377 0.706 0.052 0.370 0.140 0.887
σv 0.190 0.001 177.492 <0.001 0.199 0.001 173.719 <0.001
σu 0.496 0.030 16.756 <0.001 0.447 0.024 18.891 <0.001
Table 10: MLE Parameter Estimates: p-values are for a two-sided test of the null hypothesis
that the estimated parameter is equal to zero.
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A.3 Additional results
A.3.1 Species-specific rent
A. Pre-Catch Shares Period 2009-10
Whit. Sblf. D. Sole T. Heads Non-DTS Other Sp. Crab Shrimp Sblf. Pot
yi 3,964.77 52.58 218.47 50.30 145.91 13.23 72.77 370.87 44.09
pi 0.06 2.06 0.35 0.52 0.46 1.11 2.05 0.49 2.61
Ci(.) 0.03 0.69 0.10 0.33 0.27 0.60 0.81 0.22 1.06
pi −Ci(.) 0.04 1.31 0.24 0.18 0.17 0.51 0.82 0.22 1.55
B. IFQ Period 2011-12
Whit. Sblf. D. Sole T. Heads Non-DTS Other Sp. Crab Shrimp Sblf. Pot
yi 3,780.35 40.87 204.92 44.68 153.00 21.53 62.29 582.47 90.28
pi 0.07 2.21 0.43 0.56 0.64 1.07 2.98 0.61 2.91
Ci(.) 0.04 1.13 0.14 0.43 0.42 0.83 1.21 0.35 2.05
pi −Ci(.) 0.01 0.99 0.26 0.10 0.20 0.23 1.01 0.19 0.85
C. IFQ Period 2013-16
Whit. Sblf. D. Sole T. Heads Non-DTS Other Sp. Crab Shrimp Sblf. Pot
yi 5,347.60 46.71 264.54 53.76 249.15 32.05 90.54 846.53 175.65
pi 0.06 1.68 0.44 0.57 0.64 1.02 3.59 0.63 2.96
Ci(.) 0.05 1.26 0.14 0.43 0.55 0.96 1.65 0.45 3.87
pi −Ci(.) -0.01 0.26 0.24 0.10 0.05 0.06 1.36 0.14 -0.92
Table 11: Landings, Price, Marginal Cost, and Marginal Profit. Landings yi are the average
thousands of pounds per year; Costs and profit are median values in 2016 dollars. Sblf. is
trawl-caught sablefish; D. Sole is dover sole; T. Heads is short- and longspine thornyheads;
Non-DTS includes all groundfish species excluding dover sole, thornyheads and sablefish; Other
Sp. includes pelagic and highly migratory species, salmon, and halibut; Sblf. Pot is pot-caught
sablefish.
Table 11 illustrates additional changes in groundfish rent generation during the 2009-16
data period. The table reports sample average landings (thousands of pounds), the median
prices, marginal costs, and marginal profits for the nine species we consider. Part A of the table
reports results for the pre-IFQ data; parts B and C report results for the first two years and the
following four years of IFQ regulation, in order.
A.4 Annualized capital expenditures
We follow the view that vessel capital is a quasi-fixed factor of production but adjust capital ser-
vices for the quantity of services allocated during each production period (Kirkley and Strand,
1988; Segerson and Squires, 1990). To this end, we first measure heterogeneity in capital ser-
vices for vessels in our data using a hedonic model of self-reported vessel values. We assume
sale values reflect the present value of the flow of capital services that a vessel configuration can
provide. Our data contain 278 unique observations of self-reported vessel values. We regress
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GDP-deflated vessel values on vessel length (entered quadratically), engine horse power, vessel
fuel capacity, cross-effect terms, and a quadratic time trend to control for time-varying unob-
served elements that effect vessel values.27 We use the fitted model to predict the value of each
vessel in our data in USD 2016.
We multiply these fitted values by an annual capital rental rate of 7% to obtain an estimate
of annual available capital in unit of dollars.28 Finally, we adjust the annual capital cost by the
proportion of the year the vessel capital was employed in the groundfish fishery; the reported
days at sea fishing for all landed species in our data divided by the maximum days at sea. We
denote this estimate as ki for vessel operation i.
A.5 Multispecies groundfish technology
We assume the groundfish harvest technology is joint-in-inputs.29 We assume further that
groundfish fishermen organize factor inputs to minimize the cost of landing an exogenously
determined quantities in groundfish and non-groundfish species. This assumption is motivated
by two institutional realities. First, the regulations under which groundfish fishermen operate
are designed to limit fishing mortality and address long term stock conservation goals. The con-
trolled access regime, for example, capped bi-monthly harvests of individual groundfish species.
The IFQ regulation caps annual harvest of individual species.
A second institutional feature of the West Coast groundfish trawl fishery is strong vertical
coordination between harvesting and processing firms. Vessel skippers indicate that processors
closely monitor downstream demand for the final consumable products and hire sufficient labor
to ensure sufficient processing capacity to handle influxes of the highly perishable catch. Pro-
cessing firms control the quantities of individual species and the timing of deliveries to ensure
available processing capacity is utilized efficiently.
Jointness-in-inputs is a plausible property of the groundfish technology. Cost complemen-
tarity can arises in the presence of public factors of production, i.e., multiple groundfish species
co-habitate in common marine environments and are captured together by trawl nets. An anal-
ysis of trip-level landings confirms that there are species groups that are consistently landed
together on fishing trips and other species that are consistently absent. We maintain that the
cost of harvesting species that are landed together at the trip level are separable from the costs
27The R-square statistic for this model is 0.811.
28A 7% financial capital cost is recommended by the US Office of Management and Budget as an average rate of
return on private investments (see https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/).
29Scope economies arise in multi-species commercial fisheries due to the presence of public factors of production.
Multiple groundfish species are regularly intercepted when trawl gear is dragged through the water column. Multiple
species may also be trapped as bycatch by fixed gear. Our data include annual expenditures on factors of production.
We do not identify species-specific factor allocations.
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Trips landing sp. Whit. (s.s.) Whit. (a.s.) Sblf. D. Sole T. Heads Non-DTS Other Crab Shrimp Sblf. (Pot)
Whit. (s.s.) - 0.000 0.412 0.293 0.410 0.988 0.887 0.042 0.001 0.000
Whit. (a.s.) 0.000 - 0.091 0.018 0.055 0.458 0.491 0.000 0.001 0.000
Sblf. 0.289 0.030 - 0.853 0.863 0.975 0.530 0.027 0.001 0.000
D. Sole 0.228 0.007 0.942 - 0.879 0.988 0.478 0.029 0.001 0.000
T. Heads 0.310 0.019 0.926 0.854 - 0.979 0.529 0.022 0.001 0.000
Non DTS 0.397 0.085 0.558 0.512 0.522 - 0.650 0.022 0.002 0.030
Other 0.493 0.126 0.419 0.342 0.389 0.898 - 0.030 0.003 0.004
Crab 0.069 0.000 0.065 0.061 0.049 0.090 0.091 - 0.000 0.004
Shrimp 0.003 0.008 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.013 0.013 0.012 - 0.001
Sblf. (Pot) 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.522 0.054 0.016 0.004 -
Trips w/hi > 0 8,087 3,741 11,509 10,413 10,717 20,105 14,564 4,866 3,671 1,152
Prop. w/hi > 0 0.255 0.118 0.362 0.328 0.337 0.633 0.458 0.153 0.116 0.036
Table 12: Proportion of trips landing row species that also land column species.
of jointly harvested species.30
Correlations across harvested species are reported in Table 12. Results reveal important
properties of the groundfish technology and industry organization. First, consistent with regu-
latory constraints, vessels that harvest whiting land their catch either at sea or on shore, but not
both (trip-level correlation between at-sea and shore-side whiting harvest is zero). Groundfish
fishermen do land whiting both at-sea to motherships and at shore-based processors during a
given year (see annual harvests correlations in Table 8 in Appendix A.1).
Next, gear switching occurs between but not within trips; vessels are prohibited from using
or even carrying multiple gear types on a single trip. The correlations between pot caught
sablefish and other trawl species are all zero. We see further that crab and shrimp fishing is
conducted independently of trawl fishing; trip-level correlations between crab, shrimp and all
other groundfish species are essentially zero.
Correlations across trawl-caught groundfish species including whiting, sablefish, dover sole,
thornyheads, and the non-DTS group are the range of 0.228-0.988. These species are harvested
jointly at the trip- and therefore at the seasonal levels. Harvest correlations are less than unity
and are not uniform across species. From the results in Table 12, we conclude that the assump-
tion of fixed output proportions for major trawl species is not supported by our data.
30An alternative but separate source of jointness arises in the presence of a fixed but allocatable factor of production
(Shumway et al., 1988). Our data indicate that most vessel operations spend far fewer days at sea than is physically
possible. It is unlikely these vessel operators face constraints on the available capital services. Jointness due to the
presence of a fixed but allocatable capital input is not considered further in this study.
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